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Abstract:  The paper investigates the relationship between pro-social norms and its 
implications for improved environmental outcomes.  This is an area, 
which has been neglected in the environmental economics literature. We 
provide empirical evidence to demonstrate a small but significant 
positive impact between perceived environmental cooperation (reduced 
public littering) and increased voluntary environmental morale. For this 
purpose we use European Values Survey (EVS) data for 30 European 
countries. We also demonstrate that Western European countries are 
more sensitive to perceived environmental cooperation than the public in 
Eastern Europe. Interestingly, the results also demonstrate that 
environmental morale is strongly correlated with several socio-economic 
and environmental variables.  Several robustness tests are conducted to 
check the validity of the results.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Does someone who believes that littering is rare in a public place exhibit higher 
environmental morale and act in a more environmentally conscious way? And 
does somebody who thinks that littering is common reduce his or her 
environmental morale and behavior?  
Using recent data from 30 Western and Eastern European countries, this 
paper provides empirical support for the hypothesis that the environmental 
behavior of individuals is systematically influenced by the perception of others‟ 
behavior: people act in a conditionally cooperative way, in particular with respect 
to littering. The effect is statistically significant but overall relatively small. 
However, once we focus on Western European countries the effect strongly 
increases (twice as large). We also show that individuals in Western Europe have 
a high environmental morale, while it is low in Eastern European countries. The 
evidence provided has several policy implications. In particular, the existence of a 
positive relationship between the perceived environmental behavior of other 
people and one‟s own behavior can be used to bring about beneficial 
environmental outcomes in areas where law enforcement and market incentives 
fail. The attractive and cost-effective feature of the behavioral change induced by 
policy interventions is its voluntary nature.  
An increasing number of economists have been involved in evaluating 
whether an individual‟s environmental morale and environmental motivation 
could help to reduce environmental degradation, or the problems of free riding 
associated with public goods (see Frey and Stutzer, 2008). An alternative policy 
sets out to „force‟ people to comply by punishing offenders. This is in line with 
deterrence policy based on the economics-of-crime approach. Individuals are 
taken to maximize expected utility, taking into account the probability of 
detection and the degree of punishment. However, empirical and experimental 
findings indicate that deterrence models predict too little compliance. Moreover, 
the level of compliance observed cannot be explained by the amount of risk 
aversion involved. People are more compliant than deterrence models predict 
(see, for taxation, Feld and Frey, 2002, 2007; Torgler and Frey, 2007).  
The literature suggests that social norms help us to explain a high degree 
of compliance (Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein, 1998; Torgler, 2007). In many 
situations, individuals do not act according to self-interest, but rather pro-socially 
(Meier, 2007; Frey and Meier, 2004b). Several laboratory experiments point out 
that behavior in public good games is driven by conditional cooperation: subjects 
cooperate when others cooperate and defect when other defect (for an overview, 
see Gächter, 2007). To our knowledge, no study investigates whether conditional 
cooperation is relevant in the natural environment. It thus remains uncertain 
   
 
whether results gained in experiments are directly transferable to contexts outside 
of the lab. As far as we know, this is the first study demonstrating the relationship 
between perceived environmental cooperation of others and an individual’s 
environmental morale in the field.  
The paper is set out as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the 
existing literature on social comparisons, and Section 3 presents the theoretical 
approach and develops our hypotheses. Section 4 presents the empirical results. In 
Section 5, we discuss the potential causality problems, and Section 6 concludes 
with a summary and discussion of the main results.  
 
2. Overview of the literature  
 
Many traditional models have treated public cooperation as an isolated case. 
However, subjects do not normally act as isolated individuals playing a game 
against nature. This paper emphasizes the relevance of social context in 
understanding the willingness of individuals to keep the environment clean. The 
behavior of other citizens is important to understand why people comply. Hence, 
theories of pro-social behavior, which take the impact of behavior or the 
preferences of others into account, are promising. The concept of pro-social 
behavior is widely practiced in daily life. For example, Vesterlund (2003) reports 
that charitable organizations have an incentive to ask donors who make large 
contributions to permit the use of their name when a donation is made. Such an 
announcement is likely to have a positive effect on others who have not yet made 
a contribution. It also helps to reduce the problem of free riding and encourages 
individuals to make larger contributions.  
Several theories have been put forward to explain what constitutes 
conditional cooperation. Most papers in the literature (cf. Rabin, 1998; Falk and 
Fehr, 2002) explain conditional cooperation in terms of reciprocity. In an 
environmental context, reciprocity means, for example, that if most individuals 
don‟t throw litter in a public place, other individuals would feel obliged to do 
likewise. As mentioned in the introduction, several laboratory experimental 
studies (e.g. public good experiments) provide evidence of the existence of pro-
social behavior. For example, Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001) find that 50% 
of the subjects were conditionally cooperative. Falk, Fischbacher and Gächter 
(2003) create a laboratory situation in which each subject is a member of two 
economically identical groups, where only the group members differ. The study 
observes that the same subjects contribute different amounts, depending on the 
behavior of others in the group. The study finds that contributions are larger when 
group cooperation is higher. 
As an alternative to reciprocity, the concept of conformity (cf. Henrich, 
2004) has been used to explain conditional cooperation. Conformity refers to the 
   
 
motivation of individuals to fulfill social norms (e.g. keeping the environment 
clean) and, therefore, could be interpreted in some ways as acting according to 
society‟s rules. Behaving according to social norms is a kind of by-product of 
individuals‟ psychological propensity to act the way others do in society.  
Carpenter (2004) referring to psychologists defines conformity, as „the tendency 
to copy the most prevalent behaviour in a population‟ which he states according 
to the psychology literature is „particularly a strong and robust predictor of human 
behaviour‟. This concept is less connected to incentives and benefits than is 
reciprocity. In this case, individuals would contribute, even if the good in question 
does not benefit anyone, as long as it is perceived that a sufficient number of 
individuals are contributing (Bardsley and Sausgruber, 2005). The work of 
Carpenter (2004) proves this point. Using an experiment he shows how 
conformity influences free riding. 
While several early studies provide evidence of conditional cooperation 
within a laboratory setting, an increasing number of studies have been conducted 
to check the validity of such studies outside of a laboratory setting. Frey and 
Meier (2004a) provide field experimental evidence of conditional cooperation. 
They analyze students‟ decisions regarding contributions to two social funds 
administered by the University of Zurich. Their study shows that, when more 
individuals expect others to cooperate, they are more willing to cooperate. In 
another study, Frey and Meier (2004b) observe that the strongest reaction to 
information about the behavior of other individuals is observed in students who 
are uncertain whether or not to contribute to two social funds at their University. 
Heldt (2005) conducts a natural field experiment on conditional cooperation, in 
which cross-country skiers in two Swedish ski resorts are faced with the decision 
of whether or not to contribute to ski track funding. The results suggest that the 
percentage of subjects making a contribution is higher when they know that a 
high percentage of individuals are making a contribution. Shang and Croson 
(2008) conducted a field experiment at an anonymous public radio station during 
an on-air fundraising campaign to investigate the influence of social information 
on the size of an individual‟s contribution. The results indicate that social 
information does indeed influence contributions. Martin and Randal (2008) 
conducted a natural field experiment at an art gallery where admission was free, 
but a donation could be placed in a transparent box in the foyer. The results 
showed that visitors donate significantly more when there is already some money 
in the box. 
 The study of pro-social behavior resulting from perceived public 
cooperation is an area that has largely been ignored in the environmental 
economics and management literature, despite its potential to influence 
environmental outcomes. The connection between perceived environmental 
cooperation of other individuals and environmental morale has not been studied in 
   
 
the environmental economics and management literature. In contrast, studies 
linking improved environmental behavior, or higher willingness to pay for 
environmental preservation with education, knowledge, environmental awareness 
and prior experience are well established in the environmental economics 
literature (cf. Tisdell and Wilson, 2001). The lack of studies on environmental 
conditional cooperation may be explained by the unavailability of quality survey 
data, although the concept itself may not be new to researchers in environmental 
economics and management. The European Value Survey provides quality survey 
data, covering the relevant questions that enable this study to be undertaken. 
Pro-social behavior occurs voluntarily. Such behavior is not only linked 
with public goods but also with particular private goods. The crucial feature here 
is that an individual acts according to the way the majority of the public is acting, 
and not necessarily because he or she benefits directly from such action. Hence, 
any strategies to increase pro-social behavior have the potential to improve 
environmental and social outcomes in a cost effective manner.  
In everyday life, many environmental outcomes can be improved through 
enhanced pro-social actions. In this paper, we demonstrate the relationship 
between an individual‟s perceptions of the public not throwing away litter in 
public places and an increase in the individual‟s willingness to protect the 
environment. Other areas where such behavior is useful are, for example, 
conserving energy and water, contributing to environmental conservation, 
reducing pollution, engaging in wildlife friendly gardening, becoming members 
of environmental organizations and volunteering. In fact, the number of 
environmental activities that can benefit from pro-social behavior is endless. 
This study looks at the disposal of litter to examine whether individual 
behavior is influenced by the perception of how other people behave. Despite 
littering in public places being recognized as a major public health and safety 
hazard and diminishing the aesthetic appearance of public places (cf. Ackerman, 
1997), few studies have focused on dealing with this issue. Keizer, Lindenberg 
and Steg (2008) explore the spreading of disorder in regards to littering. In three 
small field experiments they compare disorder and order conditions. The results 
indicate that the presence of graffiti more than doubled the number of people 
littering. Similarly, almost twice as much people littered when four unreturned 
shopping carts were standing around in disarray at a parking garage compared to a 
situation where the garage was clear. These results were confirmed when 
exploring also an offense against the national law (set off fireworks in the week 
before New Year‟s Eve). Thus, their results suggest that in case a certain norm-
violation becomes more common, other norms deviances are also more frequently 
observable. Litter and unkempt lawns have also been linked with crime (cf. 
Brown et al., 2004). Existing studies examine the role that education can play in 
reducing public litter (cf. Taylor et al., 2007), and the instruments (e.g. taxes, 
   
 
fines, charges and market incentives) that can be used to minimize the problem of 
public littering (cf. Fullerton and Wolverton, 2000; Ackerman, 1997; Dobbs, 
1991). One study (Kinnaman and Fullerton, 1994), dealing with garbage recycling, 
examines why some households participate in curbside recycling programs, even in the 
absence of a user fee; why other households do not participate, even in the presence of a 
user fee; and why some households choose to litter while others do not. However, the 
Kinnaman and Fullerton (1994) paper deals with user fees and does not address the issue 
of conditional cooperation in littering behavior. 
 
3. Empirical approach  
 
3.1. Data set 
 
Exploring the social norms as a dependent variable is not irrelevant. Prevailing 
social norms tend to generate increased individual cooperation in public good 
situations and, in some instances, in private goods as well (see, e.g., Gächter, 
2007; Meier 2007). Violation of social norms can have negative consequences, 
such as internal sanctions (e.g. guilt, remorse) or external legal and social 
sanctions, such as gossip and ostracism. As Polinsky and Shavell (2000) point 
out, the corresponding literature focuses on the influence that social norms have 
on individual behavior, and their role as a substitute for, or a supplement to, 
formal laws. Laws themselves can influence social norms. Rege and Telle (2001) 
suggest that social norms may explain why many individuals don‟t litter public 
places. If littering is not acceptable in a society, a “person throwing his ice-cream-
paper on the street will feel social disapproval from people observing him … 
many people do not litter even if they know that nobody is observing them, 
because littering imposes a feeling of guilt” (p. 3). Feelings of guilt or shame 
restrict behavior. 
In contrast to experimental studies conducted on conditional cooperation, 
this paper uses data collected by the European Value Survey (EVS). This is a 
European-wide survey that is conducted to investigate social, economic, cultural 
and political changes. The survey also collects data on the basic values and beliefs 
of people throughout Europe. The first EVS survey was conducted between 1981 
and 1983, the second between 1990 and 1991 and the third between 1999 and 
2001, with an increasing number of countries participating over time. The 
methodological approach is explained in detail in the EVS (1999) source book, 
which provides information on response rates, the stages of sampling procedures, 
a translation of the questionnaire, and field work, along with measures of coding 
reliability, reliability of data, and data checks. All country surveys are conducted 
by experienced professional survey organizations, with the exception of Greece. 
Interviews are face-to-face and those interviewed are adult citizens aged 18 years 
and older. Tilburg University coordinates the project and provides the guidelines 
   
 
to guarantee the use of standardized information in the surveys and to maintain 
the national representativeness of the data. To avoid framing biases, the questions 
are asked in a prescribed order. The response rates vary from country to country. 
However, the average response rate is around 60%.  
Because the EVS asks an identical set of questions in various European 
countries, the survey provides a unique opportunity to examine the impact of 
conditional cooperation on environmental morale and preferences. This paper 
considers 30 representative national samples of at least 1,000 individuals in each 
country. The survey permits us to work with a representative set of individuals, 
covering a large set of countries. The data allow us to complement previous 
laboratory and field experiments with survey studies to demonstrate the existence 
of conditional cooperation in relation to environmental issues.  
 
3.2. Dependent variable and conditional cooperation 
 
From the EVS survey data, we have selected the willingness of individuals to 
keep public places free from litter as the dependent variable. The question in the 
survey was formulated thus:   
In the following statement, please tell me whether you think 
it is never justified, always justified or somewhere in 
between: . . . to throw away litter in a public place.  
A ten-scale index is used for this question, with the two extreme scales 
being „never justified‟ (value 1) and „always justified‟ (value 10). This variable is 
identified as (a particular case of) environmental morale. The natural cut-off point 
is the value 1, where a high amount of respondents assert that throwing away litter 
in a public place is „never justified‟ (68.3%). Previous studies on other 
justifiability variables using World Values Survey data find support for a similar 
cutoff point and apply a probit model in their empirical model (cf. Swamy et al., 
2001). In line with this approach, our environmental morale (EM) variable takes 
the value 1 if the respondent says that throwing away litter in a public place is 
„never justified‟, and zero otherwise. In addition, we compare the original scale 
with an ordered probit model and an OLS with standardized/beta coefficients to 
test the relative strength of a variable. We will also use an ordered probit after re-
coding the ten-scale variable into a four-point scale (0, 1, 2, 3), with the value 3 
assigned for “never justified”. The scale numbering from 4-10 is assigned the 
value 0 due to lack of variance (2=2, 3=1). Such an approach is standard practice 
and has been used, for example, in the happiness and tax compliance literature (cf. 
Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Frey, 2008; Torgler, 2007). In general, it is important to 
go beyond the original probit model (1=never justified) since the answer to the 
question could be biased due to experimenter demand. It is obvious that the 
“socially correct” answer would be “never justified”. Such a situation arises if a 
   
 
large number of individuals, who think that it is justified to throw away litter in 
public places, state that littering is never justified. In other words, if the 
respondents want to give the “socially acceptable” answer they would say “1” 
and, if not, they would answer truthfully. In this latter case, an answer of “0” 
might be indicative of a much higher environmental morale than an answer of 
“1”. Then, we would have the problem that respondents want to avoid looking 
bad in front of the interviewer (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). It would also 
indicate that we would observe systematic biases rather than just random errors. 
We use several methods to deal with this problem. In the first instance, we try 
different cutoff points. We report, for example, a probit model, where we convert 
the values 1 and 2 to 1 (all other values = 0).
1
  In addition, we also run a two-stage 
regression approach, where the original 0/1 model is treated as just the first stage. 
In the first stage, respondents decide whether or not to answer 1 (“socially correct 
response”). We are going to explore two cases: one in which respondents refer to 
littering, and one in which not only littering, but also other aspects are considered 
(tax evasion, bribing, claiming government benefits without being entitled to 
them, joyriding, lying). In the second stage, given the decision to answer 
something other than the socially correct response, individuals report a value from 
2 to 10. In this case, the second stage regression would be used to explore the 
impact of conditional cooperation.
2
 In addition, one can also examine the 
existence of cognitive problems (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001). The 
experimental literature has shown that manipulations (e.g., order of the questions, 
exact wording or scales) can affect how people process and interpret questions. 
The problem arises because “respondents may make little mental effort in 
answering the question, such as by not attempting to recall all the relevant 
information or by not reading through the whole list of alternative responses” 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, p. 68). To check this point, we explore the 
correlation between two similar questions asked in the EVS during different parts 
of the interview:  
How interested would you say you are in politics? (IP) Very 
interested (value 1), somewhat interested (value 2), not very 
interested (value 3), not the least interested (value 4).  
How important is politics in your life? (INP) Very important  
(value 1), quite important (value 2), not very important (value 3), 
not the least important (value 4).  
                                                     
1 The results remain robust when testing alternative cutoffs. 
2 It should be noted that, in all reported models, the original variable was recoded in such a manner that a 
higher value represents a lower justifiability of littering. 
   
 
The correlation at the individual level is 0.614. Moreover, we also explore 
the correlation with the question:  
When you get together with your friends, would you say you  
discuss political matters frequently (value 3), occasionally  
(value 2) or never (value 1)? (DP).  
The correlation between the INP and the DP is 0.451 and between the IP 
and the DP is 0.564. Thus, all the variables are highly correlated. Face-to-face 
interviews may also help to guarantee that subjects are aware of the whole list of 
alternative responses. The EVS has the advantage of being a wide-ranging survey 
covering a large number of different topics. The data for the environmental 
question used in this paper were only a part of the large EV survey. Hence, this 
further reduces the environmental framing biases.  
The approaches discussed are relevant because empirical support for a 
theoretical foundation depends not only on the validity of the theory but also on 
the quality of the data. It is not possible to ascertain whether respondents are 
truthful in their answers with survey data, since truth is not observable by the 
interviewers (Kanazawa, 2005). To validate statements, one could explore the 
correlation between respondents‟ statements and observed behavior. However, 
this is only possible for specific questions (e.g., voting behavior). Using an 
attitudinal question, such as in our case, reduces the possibilities of conducting 
such a validation analysis. Nevertheless, we could explore the correlation between 
the EM and environmental performance/outcome at the macro (country) level. 
Therefore, we explore the relationship between our dependent variable and the 
Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) developed by the Yale Center for 
Environmental Law and Policy and the Center for International Earth Science 
Information Network at Columbia University. The index measures the ability of 
nations to protect the environment over the next few decades, integrating 76 data 
sets tracking natural resource endowments, past and present pollution levels, 
environmental management efforts and the capacity of a society to improve its 
environmental performance covering 21 indicators of environmental sustainability 
(see the ESI 2005). Although the conditional cooperative question (PL) has not 
been covered in the World Values Survey (WVS), the EM question has been 
asked in the WVS. We, therefore, use the WVS to explore the correlation between 
justifiability of littering and the ESI.
3
  The results are reported in Figure 1. We 
take the country mean values of all the waves to generate our “justifiability of 
ittering” variable. In this case, we don‟t recode the variable. In other words, 
higher values are correlated with a higher level of the justifiability of littering. In 
the ESI index, higher values are correlated with a higher level of environmental 
sustainability. The index ranges from 0 to 100. The highest values can be found in 
Scandinavian countries, such as Finland, Norway or Sweden (with a score of 
                                                     
3 We used country average values over the available waves. 
   
 
more than 70). Figure 1 shows an expected negative correlation relationship 
(Pearson r=-0.373) that is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Analyzing the 
linear relationship in a simple regression indicates that the „justifiability of 
littering‟ variable can explain approximately 15% of the total variance of the 
dependent variable (ESI).  Such results indicate the usefulness of working with 
attitudinal questions, despite the potential survey biases.  
Figure 1: Environmental sustainability and justifiability of littering 
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Due to discussed measurement-error problems Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2001) advise against using survey answers as dependent variable. We have 
shown in this section how you can apply approaches that deal with such potential 
biases. Dealing with these issues can help to evaluate in a better manner whether 
or not it makes sense to use an attitudinal variable as a dependent one.  
Next, we use the following question as an independent variable to 
investigate the impact of conditional cooperation (PL = perceived littering) on the 
EM. 
“According to you, how many of your compatriots do the 
following: Throw away litter in a public place?” (4=almost all, 
1=almost none) 
In general, we observe an increased interest among economists, especially 
behavioral and environmental economists, to use survey data. For example, 
   
 
research dealing with social capital, corruption, happiness and tax compliance 
explores the causes of attitudes, using other attitudinal variables as independent 
factors (cf. Diener and Suh, 2000; Brewer and Steenbergen, 2002; Uslaner, 2004; 
Brewer et al., 2004; Chang and Chu, 2006; and Torgler, 2007). In this paper, we 
investigate the correlation between perceived compliance and environmental 
morale in a multivariate analysis, controlling for other factors in order to better 
isolate the relationship. A specification based on multivariate analysis has the 
obvious advantage of presenting a more balanced view of the role of conditional 
cooperation by separating the effects of other exogenous variables. However, if 
conditional cooperation differs systematically in some other way, that also affects 
the willingness to cooperate, the results could be misleading.  
 
4. Econometric results 
 
Our multivariate analysis includes a vector of control variables. Previous research 
in environmental economics and social norms demonstrates the importance of 
considering socio-demographic and socio-economic variables along with 
variables, such as the level of church attendance, formal and informal education 
and participation in an environmental organization (cf. Torgler and Garcia-
Valiñas, 2007; Torgler, 2007). In addition, we use a further variable to identify a 
potential conditional cooperation behavior effect, namely the individual concern 
for society.
 4
 The question measures how individuals experience their surrounding 
environment. We differentiate between two different regions of Europe (i.e. 
Western and Eastern Europe) to see whether there are any discernable differences 
between the two regions.
5
 The rapid collapse of institutional structures in Eastern 
European countries during the 1990s produced a vacuum in many, if not all, of 
these countries. This led to large social costs, especially in terms of worsening 
income inequalities, increasing poverty, and poor institutional conditions resulting 
from uncertainty and high transaction costs. Torgler (2003) and Alm et al. (2006) 
show that such circumstances have had an impact on social norms. In addition, we 
are also using country fixed effects in several questions to control for country 
specific conditions.  The descriptive statistics of variables used is shown in Table 
A2. 
Table 1 and 2 present the first results of the multivariate analysis. In these 
initial estimates, we exclude income. This is because the ten-point income scale in 
the EVS is based on national currencies, which reduces the possibility of 
                                                     
4
 To what extent do you feel concerned about the living conditions of: your immediate family, 
people in your neighborhood, people in your region, fellow countrymen, Europeans, human 
beings in general, elderly people, unemployed people, immigrants, the sick and disabled? (5=very 
much, 1=not at all. Index=sum of all 10 questions). 
5
 Table A1 in the appendix lists the Western and Eastern European countries. 
   
 
comparing nations in a cross-country comparison.
6
  The self-classification of the 
respondents‟ economic situation into various economic classes may be used as a 
proxy. However, data for this purpose has not been collected in all countries. 
Thus, we include economic status sequentially in the specification. This is shown 
in Table 6. 
In Table 1, we use several models to check the robustness of results. In 
EQ1, we use a weighted probit model with the cutoff point 1 (1=littering is never 
justified, 0=everything else). To deal with the “social desirability” problem, we 
change the cutoff point in EQ2. The values 1 and 2 in the original scale have been 
coded as 1, and all other values coded as 0. The process and justification were 
discussed in the previous section. In Table 2 we show the results of the weighted 
ordered probits. EQ3, shows a weighted ordered probit, using the 10 point scale 
and recoding the scale in such a manner that it represents environmental morale 
(EM, 10=littering is never justified). In EQ4, we report the four-point weighted 
ordered probit model, and in EQ5, an OLS with beta or standardized regression 
coefficients is presented to indicate the relative importance of conditional 
cooperation compared to the other variables used. To measure quantitative effects 
in the (ordered) probit case, we calculate the marginal effects. Marginal effects 
indicate the change in the probability of individual having a specific level of 
environmental morale when the independent variable increases by one unit. For 
simplicity, the marginal effects in all the estimations are presented for the highest 
value only. Weighted estimates are conducted to make the samples correspond to 
the national distribution.
7
 Furthermore, answers such as „don‟t know‟ and missing 
values are eliminated in all estimations. This is standard procedure for work of 
this nature. 
                                                     
6
 Income is coded on a scale from 1 to 10, and these income intervals are not fully comparable 
across countries. 
7
 The weighting variable is provided by the EVS. 
                  
               
 
   
 
     Table 1: Environmental and conditional cooperation – weighted  
                   probit result 
       Notes: Robust standard errors. The reference group consists of AGE<30, MALE, MARRIED,  
       FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE.  Significance levels are:  
       * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  a recoding probit, ten point scale  
       dependent variable, c four point scale dependent variable 
 
 
 Coeff. z-
Stat. 
Marg. 
Effects 
Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. 
Effects 
 DEP. V.:  ENVIRON. WEIGHTED PROBIT WEIGHTED PROBITa 
MORALE (EM) (1) (2)     
PERCEIVED ENVIR. 
COOPERATION (PL) 
-0.065*** -6.19 -0.023 -0.097*** -8.35 -0.028 
CONCERN FOR SOCIETY 0.010*** 9.04 0.003 0.009*** 7.64 0.002 
Voluntary Organization        
Environ. Organization 0.114*** 3.16 0.04 0.142*** 3.56 0.038 
Demographic Factors        
AGE 30-39 0.099*** 3.59 0.035 0.120*** 4.10 0.033 
AGE 40-49 0.159*** 5.41 0.056 0.134*** 4.25 0.037 
AGE 50-59 0.219*** 6.8 0.075 0.185*** 5.34 0.050 
AGE 60-69 0.269*** 6.74 0.091 0.252*** 5.82 0.066 
AGE 70+ 0.237*** 5.01 0.08 0.214*** 4.11 0.056 
FEMALE 0.089*** 5.03 0.032 0.102*** 5.28 0.029 
Formal and Informal Educ.        
EDUCATION -0.001 -0.67 0 0.000 -0.06 0.000 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION -0.036*** -2.84 -0.013 -0.013 -0.95 -0.004 
Marital Status        
WIDOWED -0.037 -1.09 -0.013 -0.012 -0.32 -0.003 
DIVORCED -0.083*** -2.65 -0.03 -0.075** -2.18 -0.022 
SEPARATED -0.102 -1.64 -0.037 -0.114 -1.75 -0.034 
NEVER MARRIED -0.113*** -4.55 -0.041 -0.125*** -4.74 -0.036 
Employment Status        
PART TIME EMPLOYEE -0.128*** -3.95 -0.047 -0.065* -1.85 -0.019 
SELF-EMPLOYED 0.048 1.36 0.017 0.078** 2.01 0.021 
RETIRED 0.106*** 3.18 0.037 0.114*** 3.06 0.032 
AT HOME 0.176*** 5.34 0.06 0.139*** 3.88 0.038 
STUDENT -0.158*** -3.89 -0.058 -0.122*** -2.84 -0.036 
UNEMPLOYED 0.01 0.33 0.004 -0.027 -0.80 -0.008 
OTHER 0.091 1.44 0.032 0.117* 1.75 0.032 
Religiosity        
CHURCH ATTENDANCE 0.010*** 3.01 0.004 0.013*** 3.70 0.004 
REGIONS YES     YES     
Pseudo R2 0.024    0.026   
Number of observations 32433    32433   
Prob > chi2 / Prob > F 0.000     0.000     
   
 
 
Table 2: Environmental and conditional cooperation – weighted ordered 
probit and weighted OLS 
  Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. 
Effects 
Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. 
Effects 
Beta t-
Stat. 
 DEP. V.:  ENVIRON. WEIGHTED ORDERED 
PROBITb 
WEIGHTED ORDERED 
PROBITc 
WEIGHTED 
OLS 
MORALE (EM) (3) (4) (5) 
PERCEIVED ENVIR. 
COOPERATION (PL) 
-0.082*** -8.00 -0.029 -0.081*** -7.92 -0.029 -
0.057*** 
-9.38 
CONCERN FOR 
SOCIETY 
0.009*** 8.91 0.003 0.009*** 8.99 0.003 0.050*** 8.58 
Voluntary Organization         
Environ. Organization 0.120*** 3.60 0.042 0.130*** 3.87 0.045 0.015*** 2.84 
Demographic Factors         
AGE 30-39 0.104*** 4.16 0.037 0.105*** 4.08 0.037 0.041*** 4.73 
AGE 40-49 0.142*** 5.21 0.050 0.143*** 5.12 0.050 0.049*** 5.58 
AGE 50-59 0.205*** 6.89 0.071 0.206*** 6.79 0.071 0.064*** 7.66 
AGE 60-69 0.256*** 6.87 0.087 0.259*** 6.86 0.088 0.066*** 7.24 
AGE 70+ 0.227*** 5.06 0.077 0.228*** 5.03 0.077 0.058*** 6.63 
FEMALE 0.092*** 5.59 0.033 0.095*** 5.65 0.034 0.038*** 6.17 
Formal and Informal 
Educ. 
        
EDUCATION 0.001 0.42 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.10 -
0.0001 
0.011* 1.92 
POLITICAL 
DISCUSSION 
-0.023* -1.91 -0.008 -0.024* -1.92 -0.009 -0.003 -0.48 
Marital Status         
WIDOWED -0.018 -0.56 -0.006 -0.025 -0.76 -0.009 -0.006 -1.16 
DIVORCED -0.084*** -2.85 -0.031 -0.079*** -2.62 -0.029 -
0.020*** 
-3.45 
SEPARATED -0.118** -2.07 -0.043 -0.110* -1.90 -0.040 -0.012** -2.00 
NEVER MARRIED -0.115*** -5.06 -0.042 -0.117*** -5.06 -0.043 -
0.044*** 
-5.56 
Employment Status         
PART TIME 
EMPLOYEE 
-0.090*** -3.11 -0.033 -0.095*** -3.18 -0.035 -0.010* -1.70 
SELF-EMPLOYED 0.062* 1.88 0.022 0.069** 2.06 0.024 0.013** 2.33 
RETIRED 0.109*** 3.43 0.039 0.112*** 3.48 0.039 0.030*** 3.57 
AT HOME 0.161*** 5.12 0.056 0.160*** 5.02 0.055 0.025*** 4.16 
STUDENT -0.124*** -3.40 -0.045 -0.124*** -3.31 -0.045 -0.013* -1.77 
UNEMPLOYED -0.009 -0.31 -0.003 -0.012 -0.38 -0.004 -0.011* -1.66 
OTHER 0.117** 2.12 0.041 0.108* 1.89 0.038 0.010* 1.87 
Religiosity         
CHURCH 
ATTENDANCE 
0.010*** 3.17 0.004 0.011*** 3.47 0.004 0.023*** 4.10 
REGIONS YES     YES     YES   
Pseudo R2 0.014    0.017    0.028   
Number of observations 32433    32433    32433   
Prob > chi2 / Prob > F 0.000     0.000     0.000   
Notes: Robust standard errors. The reference group consists of AGE<30, MALE, MARRIED, FULL-TIME  
EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE.  Significance levels are: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05,  
*** p < 0.01. a recoding probit,b ten point scale dependent variable, c four point scale dependent variable. 
 
 
   
 
 
Consistent with our main hypothesis, the estimation results in Tables 1 
and 2 indicate that the lower the perceived environmental cooperation of other 
persons (higher values of the variable), the lower the environmental morale. In 
all the regressions, the coefficient for perceived environmental cooperation (PL) 
is statistically significant. The marginal effects indicate that, if the perceived lack 
of cooperation rises by one unit, the percentage of individuals reporting the 
highest environmental morale falls by more than 2 percentage points. A move of 
PL from the minimum to the maximum leads to increase in the share of people 
who think that littering is not okay of around 6 percentage points. Thus, we 
observe a relatively small but statistically significant effect. Interestingly, EQ5 
(Table 2) indicates the relative importance of the PL. Larger beta values are 
observed only for some of the age variables.  
Looking at the other variables in Tables 1 and 2, we observe that being 
active in an environmental organization has a positive effect, with marginal 
effects being around four (4) percentage points. Moreover, concern for others is 
also positively correlated with environmental morale (EM). A positive 
correlation can also be found for church attendance.
8
 In all cases, the coefficient 
is positively correlated with our dependent variable. This supports the argument 
that churches can act as social norm enforcers (cf. Torgler, 2006). We also 
observe a very strong age effect. This is consistent with the compliance and 
criminology literature (Hirschi and Gottfredson, 2000; Torgler, 2007), but not 
with several studies on environmental attitudes that report that age is negatively 
correlated with the willingness to contribute to additional environmental 
protection, since older people are unlikely to enjoy the long-term benefits of 
preserving resources (Whitehead, 1991; Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman, 
2000). Table 1 also reports gender differences, reporting a higher environmental 
morale among women. Zelezny et al. (2000) report that, regardless of age, 
women show more concern for the environment than men. In our analysis, we 
observe strong gender differences. On the one hand, the results show a robust 
relationship between information or formal education and EM.
 9,10
  With 
reference to educational issues, the literature shows that formal education has a 
                                                     
8
 Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, how often do you attend religious services? 
More than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a year, less 
often, practically never or never (8=more than once a week to 1=practically never or never). 
9
 Formal education is usually expressed as the extent of education or degrees a person has 
obtained. It can alternatively be expressed as the number of years spent in education (Blomquist 
and Whitehead, 1998). 
10
 Formal education: At what age did you complete or will you complete your full time 
education, either at school or at an institution of higher education? Please exclude 
apprenticeships. Informal education/political discussion: When you get together with friends, 
would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never (3=frequently, 
2=occasionally, 1=never)? 
   
 
 
significant positive influence on environmental willingness to contribute 
(Blomquist and Whitehead, 1998; Engel and Pötschke, 1998; Witzke and Urfei, 
2001; Veisten et al., 2004). On the other hand, informal education is also 
important (Whitehead, 1991; Blomquist and Whitehead, 1998; Carlsson and 
Johansson-Stenman, 2000; Hidano et al., 2005). The literature argues that well-
informed citizens are more aware of environmental issues and problems and 
have stronger environmental attitudes, because they are more knowledgeable 
about the possible damage (Danielson et al., 1995; Torgler and Garcia-Valiñas, 
2007). However, one should note that the literature on compliance does show a 
clear relationship with regard to education (Torgler, 2007). Finally, marital status 
might influence environmental attitudes as well. It can be argued that married 
people are more compliant or more concerned about environmental degradation 
than others, especially compared to single people. They are more constrained by 
their social network and are often very involved with the community (Tittle, 
1980). This argument also holds true when focusing on moral attitudes or, in our 
case, environmental morale. Overall, the estimates indicate a tendency for 
married people to have relatively high environmental preferences and high levels 
of environmental morale, although the differences are not always statistically 
significant.  
In Figures 2 and 3 and Tables 3 and 4, we explore whether the 
conditional cooperation effect holds for both regions, namely Western and 
Eastern Europe. First, we explore the conditional cooperation effect at the 
country level. For this purpose, we build average values for each country, using 
the 10 point scale (10=never justified) available for the environmental morale 
variable. Figure 2 shows a relatively strong negative correlation (Pearson r=-
0.460), significant at the 0.05 level. The simple linear regression shows that the 
PL variable can explain more than 20% of the total variance of the EM variable 
in Western Europe. On the other hand, the correlation between PL and EM is not 
statistically significant for Eastern Europe (see Figure 3). 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Figure 2: Perceived environmental cooperation and  
                environmental morale in Western Europe 
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Figure 3: Perceived environmental cooperation and 
environmental morale in Eastern Europe 
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        Table 3:  Regional differences – Western Europe 
  
WESTERN EUROPE 
Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. 
Effects 
Beta t-Stat. 
DEP. VARIABLE: WEIGHTED PROBIT WEIGHTED OLS 
 ENVIRONMENTAL 
MORALE (EM) 
(6) (7) 
PERCEIVED ENVIRON. 
COOPERATION (PL) 
-0.174*** -10.51 -0.050 -0.102*** -12.01 
CONCERN FORSOCIETY 0.014*** 8.47 0.004 0.081*** 10.15 
Voluntary Organization      
Environ. Organization 0.220*** 4.72 0.059 0.023*** 3.27 
Demographic Factors      
AGE 30-39 0.143*** 3.47 0.040 0.045*** 3.80 
AGE 40-49 0.163*** 3.58 0.045 0.055*** 4.53 
AGE 50-59 0.161*** 3.33 0.044 0.063*** 5.29 
AGE 60-69 0.275*** 4.66 0.073 0.072*** 5.71 
AGE 70+ 0.266*** 3.68 0.070 0.066*** 5.25 
FEMALE 0.116*** 4.21 0.033 0.039*** 4.46 
Formal and Informal Educ.      
EDUCATION -0.007*** -2.70 -0.002 -0.012 -1.51 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION -0.028 -1.42 -0.008 -0.015* -1.88 
Marital Status      
WIDOWED -0.017 -0.31 -0.005 -0.004 -0.50 
DIVORCED -0.047 -0.94 -0.014 -0.016* -1.97 
SEPARATED -0.123 -1.53 -0.037 -0.012 -1.49 
NEVER MARRIED -0.031 -0.88 -0.009 -0.016 -1.53 
Employment Status      
PART TIME EMPLOYEE -0.056 -1.16 -0.016 -0.005 -0.61 
SELF-EMPLOYED 0.082 1.64 0.023 0.013* 1.74 
RETIRED 0.131** 2.57 0.036 0.030** 2.53 
AT HOME 0.029 0.63 0.008 0.001 0.13 
STUDENT -0.079 -1.32 -0.024 -0.009 -0.90 
UNEMPLOYED -0.040 -0.77 -0.012 -0.016* -1.80 
OTHER 0.082 0.92 0.023 0.009 1.28 
Religiosity      
CHURCH ATTENDANCE 0.026*** 5.24 0.008 0.048*** 6.18 
Pseudo R2 0.036    0.041   
Number of observations 17415    17415   
Prob > chi2 / Prob > F 0.000     0.000   
   Notes: Robust standard errors. The reference group consists of AGE<30, MALE, MARRIED,  
   FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE. Significance levels are: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05,  
   *** p < 0.01.  Probit = recoded version (see EQ2, Table 1), OLS =  ten point scale dependent variable.  
 
   
 
 
     Table 4:  Regional differences – Eastern Europe 
   
EASTERN EUROPE 
Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. 
Effects 
Beta t-Stat. 
 DEP. VARIABLE: WEIGHTED PROBIT WEIGHTED OLS 
 ENVIRONMENTAL MORALE 
(EM) 
(8) (9) 
PERCEIVED ENVIRON. 
COOPERATION (PL) 
-0.015 -0.88   -0.004 -0.008 -0.93 
CONCERN FORSOCIETY 0.003** 2.10    0.001 0.016* 1.92 
Voluntary Organization      
Environ. Organization -0.008 -0.10   -0.002 0.007 0.98 
Demographic Factors      
AGE 30-39 0.101** 2.36   0.027 0.036*** 2.92 
AGE 40-49 0.115** 2.55   0.031 0.043*** 3.34 
AGE 50-59 0.245*** 4.70   0.063 0.068*** 5.78 
AGE 60-69 0.255*** 3.81   0.065 0.062*** 4.66 
AGE 70+ 0.163* 2.08   0.042 0.048*** 3.87 
FEMALE 0.103*** 3.75   0.029 0.044*** 4.87 
Formal and Informal Educ.      
EDUCATION 0.010*** 3.73   0.003 0.042*** 5.81 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION 0.005 0.25   0.001 0.012 1.43 
Marital Status      
WIDOWED 0.015 0.28   0.004 -0.005 -0.64 
DIVORCED -0.086* -1.77 -0.025 -0.021** -2.47 
SEPARATED -0.045 -0.40 -0.013 -0.007 -0.85 
NEVER MARRIED -0.227*** -5.55 -0.066 -0.073*** -5.78 
Employment Status      
PART TIME EMPLOYEE -0.087 -1.64  -0.025 -0.016* -1.84 
SELF-EMPLOYED 0.068 1.10  0.018 0.011 1.36 
RETIRED 0.088 1.54  0.024 0.028** 2.25 
AT HOME 0.314*** 5.26  0.077 0.052*** 6.62 
STUDENT -0.138** -2.23 - 0.040 -0.013 -1.11 
UNEMPLOYED 0.004 0.08  0.001 -0.002 -0.19 
OTHER 0.169 1.63  0.043 0.011 1.37 
Religiosity      
CHURCH ATTENDANCE -0.0004 -0.08 -0.0001 -0.004 -0.45 
Pseudo R2     0.027   
Number of observations     15018   
Prob > chi2 / Prob > F 0.000     0.000   
      Notes: Robust standard errors. The reference group consists of AGE<30, MALE, MARRIED,  FULL- 
     TIME EMPLOYEE. Significance levels are: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.   
      Probit = recoded version (see EQ2, Table 1), OLS = ten point scale dependent variable.  
   
 
 
It is interesting to note that a study in Australia has found that littering is 
more commonplace in regional and rural areas (see Beverage Industry 
Environment Council, 2001). One reason for this could be that, in areas with low 
incomes, littering is taken for granted and most individuals do not find littering 
to be a problem. Hence, such an attitude has very little or no impact on morale. A 
similar result is observable at the individual level (see Tables 3 and 4). EQ6 and 
EQ7 in Table 3 focus on Western Europe, and EQ8 and EQ9 on Eastern Europe 
(Table 4). Here, too, we observe a similar picture. The coefficient PL is 
statistically significant in Western Europe, but not in Eastern Europe. The 
marginal effects for the PL in Western Europe are comparable to age and the 
environmental organization variable. The OLS estimates even report the largest 
beta coefficients for the PL for Western Europe. Interestingly, we also observe 
other regional differences in Tables 3 and 4. Religiosity (in our case church 
attendance) only matters for Western Europe. This shows that environmental 
social norm enforcement through churches is not observable in Eastern Europe. 
One reason might be that that communist countries tried to eradicate organized 
religion in most East European countries over a long period of time, regarding it 
as “competitive with the Communist quasi-religion” (Barro and McCleary, 2002, 
p.13). Moreover, participation in an environmental organization is only 
important for Western Europe. This could partly be explained by the lack of 
environmental organizations in most East European countries, especially during 
the communist regime. On the other hand, formal education is positively 
correlated with the EM for Eastern Europe, but not for Western Europe. This 
result could be because, for individuals in Western countries, other forms of 
education and informal information matter more than formal education for the 
development of an EM. 
In Tables 5 and 6 we conduct several robustness tests using the same two 
models. Rather than using a dummy variable to differentiate between Western 
and Eastern Europe, we consider country fixed effects in all four reported 
regressions (EQ10-EQ13). In EQ12 and EQ13 (Table 6), we also add income 
proxies. Several studies show that the economic situation of an individual is an 
important aspect (Whitehead, 1991; Stevens et al., 1994; Blomquist and 
Whitehead, 1998; Popp, 2001; Witzke and Urfei, 2001; Bulte et al., 2005; 
Dupont, 2004; Veisten et al., 2004; Hidano et al., 2005). These studies show a 
positive relationship between income and a preference to contribute to 
environmental causes. On the one hand, our study points to a non-linear 
relationship, reporting the highest environmental morale for the middle class, but 
without being statistically significant in EQ13. On the other hand, the PL 
variable is statistically significant in all 4 cases. Compared to the previous tables, 
we observe that the marginal effects decrease, but the beta coefficients in EQ11 
   
 
 
and EQ13 (Tables 5 and 6) show that the relative importance of the PL has not 
changed.  
 
We conduct further robustness tests to deal with a potential “social 
desirability” bias. This is shown in Tables A3 and A4. We run a two-stage 
approach regression (see EQ14 to 17 in Tables A3 and A4) where the previous 
estimations were just the first stage. Initially, respondents decide whether or not 
to answer that littering is never justified (“socially correct response”). In a 
second stage, if they decide to answer something other than the socially correct 
response, individuals report a value from 2 to 10 (EQ 14 and 15 in Table A3). 
Furthermore, we use an alternative restriction by focusing on several 
justifiability variables on compliance, namely: cheating on tax if you have the 
chance, claiming state benefits to which you are not entitled, taking and driving 
away a car belonging to someone else (joy riding), lying in your own interest, 
and accepting a bribe in the course of your duties (see EQ16 and 17 in Table 
A4). If people provide the “socially desirable” answer, we would predict a 
similar answer with regard to other variables that measure social norms. The data 
indicates that in 26% of the cases, individuals report that none of these actions 
are ever justified. In Tables A3 and A4, we report the findings with regional 
(EQ14 and 16) and country fixed effects (EQ15 and 17). Looking at Tables A3 
and A4, we can also see that PL matters.  
 
5. Causality 
 
Causality remains an issue, because one‟s own attitudes may lead to the 
expectation that others behave in the same way.
 11
  However, results from 
„strategy method‟ experiments conducted by Fischbacher et al. (2001) and 
Fischbacher and Gächter (2006) suggest that causality goes from beliefs about 
others’ cheating to one‟s own behavior rather than vice versa. Nevertheless, we 
will 1) conduct Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests for endogeneity in IV estimation, 2) 
run several 2SLS estimations with three different instruments, and 3) try to filter 
out a PL bias by correcting for the possibility that individuals base their beliefs 
on how others behave or act. 
                                                     
11
 The EVS has the disadvantage that it is not a panel survey. A survey that follows individuals 
over time would help us to study the dynamics of adjustment more deeply. The question referring 
to conditional cooperation was only asked in the last EVS of 1999 through 2001. Longitudinal 
data would help us to reduce problems caused by unobserved individual heterogeneity. 
   
 
 
   Table 5: Robustness tests 
DEP. VARIABLE: 
ENVIRONMENTAL MORALE (EM) 
Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. 
Effects 
Beta t-
Stat. 
 WEIGHTED PROBIT WEIGHTED OLS 
(10) (11) 
PERCEIVED ENVIRON. COOPERATION (PL) -0.102** -7.86 -0.027 -0.059** -8.30 
CONCERN FORSOCIETY 0.016** 11.99 0.004 0.084** 12.64 
Voluntary Organization      
Environ. Organization 0.119** 2.72 0.030 0.011* 1.93 
Demographic Factors      
AGE 30-39 0.114** 3.72 0.029 0.031** 3.70 
AGE 40-49 0.124*** 3.75 0.032 0.035** 4.00 
AGE 50-59 0.207** 5.74 0.051 0.055** 6.68 
AGE 60-69 0.307** 6.77 0.073 0.068** 7.65 
AGE 70+ 0.304** 5.57 0.072 0.061** 6.85 
FEMALE 0.147** 7.35 0.039 0.052** 7.87 
Formal and Informal Educ.      
EDUCATION 0.004** 2.08 0.001 0.022** 3.70 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION 0.014 0.93 0.004 0.008 1.28 
Income      
UPPER CLASS      
MIDDLE CLASS      
Marital Status      
WIDOWED -0.023 -0.58 -0.006 -0.003 -0.53 
DIVORCED -0.049 -1.35 -0.013 -0.011* -1.80 
SEPARATED -0.134* -1.96 -0.038 -0.013** -2.20 
NEVER MARRIED -0.155** -5.54 -0.043 -0.049** -6.00 
Employment Status      
PART TIME EMPLOYEE -0.031 -0.87 -0.008 -0.007 -1.09 
SELF-EMPLOYED 0.033 0.81 0.009 0.005 0.89 
RETIRED 0.072* 1.86 0.019 0.016* 1.85 
AT HOME -0.014 -0.36 -0.004 -0.006 -0.90 
STUDENT -0.156** -3.52 -0.044 -0.028** -3.35 
UNEMPLOYED -0.032 -0.91 -0.009 -0.007 -1.09 
OTHER 0.086 1.26 0.022 0.010* 1.90 
Religiosity      
CHURCH ATTENDANCE -0.002 -0.54 -0.001 -0.001 -0.21 
COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS YES     YES   
Pseudo R2 0.098    0.109   
Number of observations 32433    32433   
Prob > chi2 / Prob > F 0.000     0.000   
   Notes: The reference group consists of AGE<30, MALE, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE,     
   LOWEST CLASS, EASTERN EUROPE. Significance levels are: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05,  
   *** p < 0.01. Probit = recoded version (see EQ2, Table 1), OLS = ten point scale dependent variable. 
   
 
 
   Table 6: Robustness tests 
  Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. 
Effects 
Beta t-Stat. 
DEP. VARIABLE: 
ENVIRONMENTAL MORALE (EM) 
WEIGHTED PROBIT WEIGHTED OLS 
(12) (13) 
PERCEIVED ENVIRON. COOPERATION (PL) -0.112*** -6.05 -0.029 -0.062*** -6.15 
CONCERN FORSOCIETY 0.015*** 7.89 0.004 0.087*** 9.36 
Voluntary Organization      
Environ. Organization 0.087 1.41 0.022 0.005 0.57 
Demographic Factors      
AGE 30-39 0.124*** 2.85 0.031 0.032*** 2.65 
AGE 40-49 0.110** 2.30 0.028 0.033*** 2.66 
AGE 50-59 0.181*** 3.55 0.045 0.055*** 4.84 
AGE 60-69 0.250*** 3.95 0.060 0.066*** 5.31 
AGE 70+ 0.185** 2.43 0.045 0.043*** 3.42 
FEMALE 0.108*** 3.76 0.028 0.035*** 3.78 
Formal and Informal Educ.      
EDUCATION 0.000 0.05 0.000 0.013 1.36 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION -0.071* -1.70 -0.019 -0.017* -1.87 
Income      
UPPER CLASS -0.056* -1.84 -0.015 -0.013 -1.42 
MIDDLE CLASS 0.038* 1.77 0.010 0.014 1.62 
Marital Status      
WIDOWED -0.006 -0.11 -0.002 0.002 0.21 
DIVORCED -0.067 -1.24 -0.018 -0.015* -1.70 
SEPARATED -0.347*** -3.58 -0.104 -0.024*** -2.67 
NEVER MARRIED -0.142*** -3.48 -0.038 -0.040*** -3.63 
Employment Status      
PART TIME EMPLOYEE 0.023 0.41 0.006 0.006 0.63 
SELF-EMPLOYED 0.058 1.00 0.015 0.005 0.61 
RETIRED 0.122** 2.32 0.031 0.028** 2.41 
AT HOME 0.006 0.11 0.002 -0.002 -0.26 
STUDENT -0.051 -0.75 -0.013 -0.022* -1.85 
UNEMPLOYED -0.014 -0.27 -0.004 -0.009 -1.09 
OTHER 0.056 0.62 0.014 0.007 0.96 
Religiosity      
CHURCH ATTENDANCE -0.003 -0.59 -0.001 0.002 0.24 
COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS YES     YES   
Pseudo R2 0.112    0.127   
Number of observations 16987    16987   
Prob > chi2 / Prob > F 0.000     0.000   
Notes: The reference group consists of AGE<30, MALE, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, 
LOWEST CLASS, EASTERN EUROPE. Significance levels are: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** 
p < 0.01. Probit = recoded version (see EQ2, Table 1), OLS = ten point scale dependent variable. 
   
 
 
 Tables 7 and 8report the results of three two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimations, together with their first stage regressions. For instruments, equation 
18 uses „individual interest in friends‟, equation 19 uses „index of perceived 
honesty‟ , and equation 20 uses „trusting others‟.12,13, 14  We are going to add the 
second two instruments sequentially into the specification. A stronger preference 
and awareness for interactions besides one‟s own behavior may trigger 
conditional cooperation. As a proxy, we use the variable interest in friends. We 
observe a low correlation between this instrument and the residual (r=0.04), 
which indicates that such a variable affects PL, but not EM. Moreover, an overall 
perceived impression of the compliance with regard to more serious legal 
offenses (e.g., tax evasion), should also affect how people perceive the way 
others behave in other areas, such as littering (e.g., areas where deviations from 
law are less enforced and punished). We build an index of perceived honesty, 
and observe a high correlation with PL (r=0.5) and a low correlation with the 
equation‟s disturbance process (r=0.03), which supports the requirements of a 
good instrument. Moreover, having a higher trust in others or in society may 
enhance comparisons and individual interest to take the perception of others‟ 
behavior into account. Interestingly, we observe practically no correlation with 
the residual (r=0.0074). In Tables 7 and 8, we provide several tests that explore 
the relevance of our instruments. The results show that the instruments and the 
F-tests for instrument exclusion set in the first-stage regression are statistically 
significant. We then conduct the Anderson‟s likelihood-ratio test. A failure to 
reject the null hypothesis would call the identification status of the estimated 
equation into question (Baum, 2006). Tables 7 and 8 show that we can reject the 
null hypothesis that our specified instruments are redundant. We also conduct a 
Durbin-WU-Hausman test for endogeneity in the three IV estimations. The null 
hypothesis in Tables 7 and 8, which indicate that the OLS is an appropriate 
estimation technique, cannot, in most cases, be rejected. In other words, the C 
test statistics suggest that we cannot reject exogeneity of our PL variable. Now, 
looking at our 2SLS results, we observe that the PL is statistically significant in 
all three estimations. This supports previous results.  
Tables A5 and A6 use yet another approach to deal with a potential 
endogeneity problem. It filters out a possible bias in the conditional cooperative 
effort. A causality problem may arise because an individual‟s willingness to 
                                                     
12
 Please say how important each of the following is in your life … friends and acquaintances 
(4=very important, 1=not the least important). 
13
 Index covering the sum of the following questions: According to you (on a scale from 1 to 4), 
how many of your compatriots: (1) Pay cash for services to avoid taxes? (2) Go over the speed 
limit in built-up areas? 
14
 Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can‟t be too 
careful in your dealings with people? (1=most people can be trusted, 0=can‟t be too careful). 
   
 
 
cooperate (low justifiability of littering) could lead to the expectation that others 
would also behave in the same way. Thus, individuals with a higher EM have a 
lower perception of others not cooperating or contributing (lower PL). To deal 
with this possibility, we first calculate the average EM for each country. In the 
second stage, we calculate the average PL cooperation in each country for 
individuals having the highest EM value.
15
  Next, we construct the difference 
between the two average values. These values may measure a particular bias in 
PL due to the level of environmental morale (e.g., high EM). The obtained 
variable (bias) is then added to the individual values of the group with the 
highest EM. As a consequence, the PL values between the group with higher and 
lower EM are brought closer together, depending on the PL level in each 
country. Tables A5 and A6 present the results for the filtered PL variable, using 
regional (EQ 21) and country (EQ 22) fixed effects. Furthermore, we observe 
that the previous results remain robust.  
 
6. Conclusions  
 
This paper investigates whether perceived environmental cooperation of the 
public is an important determinant of explaining an individual‟s environmental 
morale. We hypothesize that an individual‟s behavior is likely to be influenced 
by his or her perception of the behavior of other individuals. Our attention was 
focused on littering.  If an individual believes that throwing away litter in a 
public place is common, then the environmental morale of the individual 
decreases. In contrast, if an individual believes others to be compliant, then the 
environmental morale increases. Using recent European Value Survey data for 
Western and Eastern European countries, we provided empirical support for this 
conditional cooperation hypothesis. The effect was statistically significant but 
overall that very large. The strongest effect was observable for Western 
European countries. To our knowledge, this is the first study of this nature 
demonstrating the positive relationship between perceived environmental 
cooperation of others and an individual‟s environmental morale. The results 
remain robust, using a large number of specifications and conducting several 
robustness tests. We also address issues relating to potential causality and data 
limitation issues.  
Conditional cooperation in general suggests two (long run) equilibria. 
Zero cooperation occurs if a large number of people are littering and thus act in a 
non-cooperative way. On the other hand, nearly full cooperation could occur if a 
large number of people are not littering. Our results indicate that individuals in  
                                                     
15
 Value 1, stressing that throwing away litter in a public place is never justifiable. 
   
 
 
   Table 7:  Instrumental approach 
  Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-
Stat. 
 DEP. V.: 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
MORALE (EM) 
WEIGHTED 2SLS FIRST STAGE 
REGRESSION 
 
WEIGHTED 2SLS FIRST STAGE 
REGRESSION 
 
(18) (19) 
PERCEIVED ENVIRON. 
COOPERATION (PL) 
-0.081** -2.36    -0.083** -2.42   
CONCERN FORSOCIETY 0.018*** 12.19 0.0003 0.54 0.018*** 12.01 0.0001 0.20 
Voluntary Organization         
Environ. Organization 0.080* 1.84 0.030 1.51 0.078* 1.79 0.030 1.50 
Demographic Factors         
AGE 30-39 0.121*** 3.40 -0.052*** -3.51 0.122*** 3.43 -0.050*** -3.38 
AGE 40-49 0.144*** 3.84 -0.064*** -4.14 0.150*** 4.00 -0.061*** -3.93 
AGE 50-59 0.238*** 6.14 -0.038** -2.28 0.242*** 6.23 -0.035** -2.11 
AGE 60-69 0.344*** 7.69 -0.046** -2.29 0.350*** 7.85 -0.046** -2.26 
AGE 70+ 0.340*** 6.36 -0.051** -2.12 0.344*** 6.45 -0.049** -2.03 
FEMALE 0.167*** 7.56 0.064*** 6.91 0.166*** 7.47 0.062*** 6.75 
Formal and Informal Educ.         
EDUCATION 0.007*** 3.49 0.000 -0.10 0.007*** 3.41 0.000 -0.08 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION 0.017 1.05 0.002 0.31 0.019 1.15 0.002 0.34 
Marital Status         
WIDOWED -0.025 -0.72 -0.011 -0.64 -0.022 -0.62 -0.010 -0.63 
DIVORCED -0.072* -1.78 0.002 0.15 -0.069* -1.72 0.002 0.10 
SEPARATED -0.180** -2.19 0.041 1.26 -0.162** -1.99 0.042 1.27 
NEVER MARRIED -0.190*** -5.96 0.023* 1.71 -0.185*** -5.80 0.022 1.62 
Employment Status         
PART TIME EMPLOYEE -0.019 -0.47 -0.013 -0.78 -0.020 -0.48 -0.013 -0.76 
SELF-EMPLOYED 0.042 0.97 -0.016 -0.91 0.038 0.87 -0.013 -0.73 
RETIRED 0.071** 1.98 0.015 0.92 0.069* 1.93 0.016 0.98 
AT HOME -0.030 -0.80 0.001 0.07 -0.025 -0.67 0.002 0.10 
STUDENT -0.210*** -3.35 0.082*** 3.52 -0.213*** -3.39 0.081*** 3.48 
UNEMPLOYED -0.050 -1.18 -0.002 -0.12 -0.046 -1.09 0.001 0.07 
OTHER 0.106 1.64 0.013 0.41 0.104 1.60 0.015 0.46 
Religiosity         
CHURCH ATTENDANCE 0.001 0.22 -0.006*** -2.95 0.001 0.18 -0.006*** -3.00 
COUNTRY FIXED EFF. YES   YES   YES   YES   
Instruments:           
Index perceived honesty   0.288*** 69.62   0.288*** 69.58 
Interest in friends        0.010* 1.67 
Trusting others           
Test of excluded instruments   4846***     2427***   
Identification/IV relevance 
test (Anderson LR statistics) 
6238***     6226***     
Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests: 
C stat.  
 
 
2.594 
    
 
2.780* 
 
   
Centered R2 0.112     0.112     
Number of observations 29853     29733     
Prob > F 0.000       0.000       
    Notes: Robust standard errors. The reference group consists of AGE<30, MALE, MARRIED,  
    FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE. Significance levels are: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
   
 
 
  
   Table 8:  Instrumental approach 
  Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. 
DEP. V.: ENVIRONMENTAL 
MORALE (EM) 
WEIGHTED 2SLS FIRST STAGE 
REGRESSION 
(20) 
PERCEIVED ENVIRON. 
COOPERATION (PL) 
-0.074** -2.13   
CONCERN FORSOCIETY 0.018*** 11.91 0.0002 0.38 
Voluntary Organization     
Environ. Organization 0.060 1.33 0.034* 1.67 
Demographic Factors     
AGE 30-39 0.127*** 3.51 -0.048*** -3.17 
AGE 40-49 0.153*** 4.03 -0.057*** -3.58 
AGE 50-59 0.249*** 6.35 -0.031* -1.82 
AGE 60-69 0.344*** 7.61 -0.046** -2.23 
AGE 70+ 0.354*** 6.57 -0.047* -1.94 
FEMALE 0.166*** 7.39 0.062*** 6.62 
Formal and Informal Educ.     
EDUCATION 0.007*** 3.36 0.000 0.11 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION 0.015 0.91 0.003 0.42 
Marital Status     
WIDOWED -0.018 -0.51 -0.009 -0.55 
DIVORCED -0.070* -1.73 0.003 0.21 
SEPARATED -0.150* -1.83 0.038 1.13 
NEVER MARRIED -0.182*** -5.62 0.022* 1.65 
Employment Status     
PART TIME EMPLOYEE -0.029 -0.69 -0.012 -0.68 
SELF-EMPLOYED 0.038 0.87 -0.010 -0.53 
RETIRED 0.065* 1.79 0.019 1.14 
AT HOME -0.029 -0.77 0.002 0.10 
STUDENT -0.225*** -3.46 0.078*** 3.27 
UNEMPLOYED -0.048 -1.12 0.001 0.03 
OTHER 0.119* 1.82 0.027 0.81 
Religiosity     
CHURCH ATTENDANCE 0.001 0.19 -0.006*** -3.13 
COUNTRY FIXED EFF. YES   YES   
Instruments:      
Index perceived honesty   0.287*** 67.69 
Interest in friends   0.011* 1.72 
Trusting others   -0.031*** -3.30 
Test of excluded instruments   1548***   
Identification/IV relevance test 
(Anderson LR statistics) 
5973***     
Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests: 
C stat. (exogeneity/orthogonality of 
suspect instruments 
 
 
2.088 
   
Centered R2 0.112     
Number of observations 28770     
Prob > F 0.000       
   Notes: Robust standard errors. The reference group consists of AGE<30, MALE, MARRIED,  
   FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE. Significance levels are: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
   
 
 
Western countries have high environmental morale, while it is low in Eastern 
European countries. A critical mass of cooperative individuals is required to 
induce a positive dynamic process of conditional cooperation. On the other hand, 
a society, which has many non-compliant individuals, will exhibit weaker social 
norms. Policies should take into account such path-dependent processes within a 
society. The closer we are to the threshold or tipping point, the easier it is to 
influence the dynamic conditional cooperative processes. However, identifying 
such a tipping point is not without problems. One possibility is to change the 
underlying institutional conditions (see, Friedman et al. 2002). Institutional 
improvements can provide shocks to a new equilibrium (Bird et al. 2006) and 
increases the chance of moving beyond the threshold point to induce positive 
conditional cooperative dynamics.  
Understanding what shapes environmental morale needs to be investigated 
further. A good understanding of the interactions between environmental morale 
and perceived environmental cooperation, and the factors strengthening these 
relationships, has the potential to bring about better environmental outcomes.  
 
Appendix 
 
               Table A1: Countries 
 
Western European Countries Eastern European Countries 
Germany Belarus 
Austria Bulgaria 
Belgium Croatia 
Denmark Czech Republic 
Finland Estonia 
France Greece 
Great Britain Hungary 
Iceland Latvia 
Ireland Lithuania 
Italy Poland 
Malta Romania 
Netherlands Russia 
North Ireland Slovak Republic 
Portugal Ukraine 
Spain  
Sweden  
 
 
   
 
 
 
    Table A2: Descriptive statistics 
VARIABLES Obs      Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
ENVIRONMENTAL MORALE (EM) 40674        0.683 0.465 0 1 
PERCEIVED ENVIRONMENTAL 
COOPERATION (PL) 37437      0.710 0.777 1 4 
INDEX CONCERN FOR SOCIETY 38540      34.864 7.727 11 55 
ENVIRON. ORGANIZATION 41125 0.049 0.216 0 1 
AGE 30-39 40963 0.197 0.398 0 1 
AGE 40-49 40963 0.191 0.393 0 1 
AGE 50-59 40963 0.150 0.357 0 1 
AGE 60-69 40963 0.135 0.342 0 1 
AGE 70+ 40963 0.102 0.302 0 1 
FEMALE 41114 0.540 0.498 0 1 
EDUCATION 39840 18.712 5.125 5 74 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION 40713 1.886 0.654 1 3 
UPPER CLASS 21335 0.136 0.343 0 1 
MIDDLE CLASS 21335 0.338 0.473 0 1 
WIDOWED 39861 0.097 0.295 0 1 
DIVORCED 39861 0.070 0.256 0 1 
SEPARATED 39861 0.016 0.124 0 1 
NEVER MARRIED 39861 0.228 0.420 0 1 
PART TIME EMPLOYEE 40919 0.068 0.252 0 1 
SELF-EMPLOYED 40919 0.052 0.222 0 1 
UNEMPLOYED 40919 0.229 0.420 0 1 
AT HOME 40919 0.095 0.293 0 1 
STUDENT 40919 0.061 0.240 0 1 
RETIRED 40919 0.073 0.261 0 1 
OTHER 40919 0.018 0.131 0 1 
CHURCH ATTENDANCE 40762 3.871 2.456 1 8 
INSTRUMENTS      
INTEREST IN FRIENDS 40885 3.289 0.690 1 4 
INDEX PERCEIVED HONESTY 34478 5.429 1.162 2 8 
TRUSTING OTHERS 39505 0.296 0.457 0 1 
 
   
 
 
 
   Table A3: Two-stage approach reporting second stage regressions 
Second Stage Regression Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. 
DEP. VARIABLE: WEIGHTED OLS WEIGHTED OLS 
ENVIRONMENTAL MORALE 
(EM) 
 (14)    (15)   
  First stage:  
Decision whether to give socially correct response (littering) 
PERCEIVED ENVIRON. 
COOPERATION (PL) 
-0.120*** -10.35 -0.119 -10.19 
CONCERN FOR SOCIETY 0.010*** 8.75 0.010*** 8.24 
Voluntary Organization     
Environ. Organization 0.109*** 2.67 0.097** 2.37 
Demographic Factors     
AGE 30-39 0.162*** 5.13 0.161*** 5.04 
AGE 40-49 0.199*** 5.97 0.197*** 5.84 
AGE 50-59 0.284*** 7.88 0.288*** 7.93 
AGE 60-69 0.308*** 6.94 0.310*** 6.93 
AGE 70+ 0.317*** 6.23 0.325*** 6.30 
FEMALE 0.124*** 6.33 0.114*** 5.78 
Formal and Informal Educ.     
EDUCATION 0.003* 1.80 0.003 1.49 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION -0.007 -0.48 -0.006 -0.42 
Marital Status     
WIDOWED -0.036 -1.00 -0.032 -0.88 
DIVORCED -0.127*** -3.57 -0.124*** -3.43 
SEPARATED -0.152** -2.16 -0.172** -2.42 
NEVER MARRIED -0.170*** -6.03 -0.164*** -5.77 
Employment Status     
PART TIME EMPLOYEE -0.064* -1.75 -0.041 -1.10 
SELF-EMPLOYED 0.091*** 2.28 0.088** 2.19 
RETIRED 0.116*** 3.26 0.117*** 3.24 
AT HOME 0.138*** 3.92 0.153*** 4.31 
STUDENT -0.097** -2.09 -0.096** -2.03 
UNEMPLOYED -0.066* -1.84 -0.049 -1.34 
OTHER 0.122* 1.81 0.159** 2.33 
Religiosity     
CHURCH ATTENDANCE 0.015*** 3.99 0.015*** 3.92 
REGIONAL FIXED EFFECT YES    
COUNTRY FIXED EFFECT   YES  
R2 0.028   0.028   
Prob > F 0.000   0.000   
   Notes: Robust standard errors. The reference group consists of AGE<30, MALE, MARRIED, FULL   
   TIME  EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. Significance levels are: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p <  
   0.05, *** p <  0.01.  
   
 
 
    Table A4: Two-stage approach reporting second stag regressions 
Second Stage Regression Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. 
DEP. VARIABLE: WEIGHTED OLS WEIGHTED OLS 
ENVIRONMENTAL MORALE 
(EM) 
 (16)    (17)   
  First stage: 
Decision whether to give socially correct response (littering, tax evasion, 
bribing, claiming government benefits without being entitled to them, 
joyriding, lying) 
PERCEIVED ENVIRON. 
COOPERATION (PL) 
-0.120*** -9.96 -0.121*** -9.96 
CONCERN FOR SOCIETY 0.018*** 14.64 0.018*** 14.11 
Voluntary Organization     
Environ. Organization 0.058 1.40 0.052 1.24 
Demographic Factors     
AGE 30-39 0.135*** 4.44 0.133*** 4.32 
AGE 40-49 0.166*** 5.18 0.162*** 4.99 
AGE 50-59 0.278*** 8.01 0.279*** 7.98 
AGE 60-69 0.332*** 7.75 0.337*** 7.79 
AGE 70+ 0.376*** 7.64 0.379*** 7.61 
FEMALE 0.165*** 8.70 0.157*** 8.21 
Formal and Informal Educ.     
EDUCATION 0.007*** 3.89 0.007*** 3.86 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION 0.020 1.45 0.022 1.54 
Marital Status     
WIDOWED -0.034 -0.98 -0.035 -1.00 
DIVORCED -0.081** -2.34 -0.074** -2.13 
SEPARATED -0.123* -1.82 -0.143** -2.08 
NEVER MARRIED -0.183*** -6.66 -0.183*** -6.59 
Employment Status     
PART TIME EMPLOYEE -0.035 -0.99 -0.015 -0.41 
SELF-EMPLOYED 0.038 0.98 0.035 0.89 
RETIRED 0.062* 1.78 0.061* 1.74 
AT HOME -0.051 -1.47 -0.038 -1.10 
STUDENT -0.150*** -3.34 -0.149*** -3.28 
UNEMPLOYED -0.072** -2.08 -0.057 -1.63 
OTHER 0.080 1.24 0.123* 1.87 
Religiosity     
CHURCH ATTENDANCE -0.001 -0.13 -0.002 -0.48 
REGIONAL FIXED EFFECT YES    
COUNTRY FIXED EFFECT   YES  
R2 0.104   0.104   
Prob > F 0.000   0.000   
      Notes: Robust standard errors. The reference group consists of AGE<30, MALE, MARRIED,  
       FULL-TIME    EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. Significance levels are: * 0.05 < p < 0.10,  
      ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p  < 0.01.  
   
 
 
     Table A5:  Filtered perceived environmental cooperation (EL) 
WEIGHTED PROBIT Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. 
Effects 
DEPENDENT V.: ENVIRONMENTAL MORALE 
(EM) 
 (21) 
FILTERED PERCEIVED ENVIRON. 
COOPERATION (PL) 
-0.043*** -4.10 -0.015 
CONCERN FOR SOCIETY 0.010*** 9.05 0.003 
Voluntary Organization    
Environ. Organization 0.116*** 3.21 0.040 
Demographic Factors    
AGE 30-39 0.101*** 3.67 0.036 
AGE 40-49 0.162*** 5.50 0.056 
AGE 50-59 0.222*** 6.90 0.076 
AGE 60-69 0.274*** 6.85 0.093 
AGE 70+ 0.242*** 5.12 0.082 
FEMALE 0.088*** 5.00 0.032 
Formal and Informal Educ.    
EDUCATION -0.001 -0.67 0.000 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION -0.036*** -2.81 -0.013 
Marital Status    
WIDOWED -0.037 -1.08 -0.013 
DIVORCED -0.083*** -2.65 -0.030 
SEPARATED -0.102* -1.65 -0.037 
NEVER MARRIED -0.113*** -4.58 -0.041 
Employment Status    
PART TIME EMPLOYEE -0.128*** -3.96 -0.047 
SELF-EMPLOYED 0.048 1.34 0.017 
RETIRED 0.104*** 3.14 0.037 
AT HOME 0.175*** 5.33 0.060 
STUDENT -0.159*** -3.92 -0.059 
UNEMPLOYED 0.011 0.36 0.004 
OTHER 0.092 1.45 0.032 
Religiosity    
CHURCH ATTENDANCE 0.010*** 2.97 0.004 
REGION YES     
COUNTRY     
Pseudo R2 0.023    
Number of observations 32433    
Prob > chi2  0.000     
      Notes: The reference group consists of AGE<30, MALE, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE,  
      LOWEST CLASS, EASTERN EUROPE. Probit = original version (see EQ1, Table 1). Significance  
      levels are: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p <0.05,*** p < 0.01.  
 
   
   
 
 
  Table A6:  Filtered perceived environmental cooperation (EL) 
WEIGHTED PROBIT Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. 
Effects 
DEPENDENT V.: ENVIRONMENTAL MORALE (EM)  (22) 
FILTERED PERCEIVED ENVIRON. 
COOPERATION (PL) 
-0.030** -2.53 -0.010 
CONCERN FOR SOCIETY 0.017*** 13.94 0.006 
Voluntary Organization    
Environ. Organization 0.103*** 2.64 0.035 
Demographic Factors    
AGE 30-39 0.096*** 3.36 0.033 
AGE 40-49 0.157*** 5.13 0.053 
AGE 50-59 0.245*** 7.37 0.081 
AGE 60-69 0.323*** 7.81 0.105 
AGE 70+ 0.326*** 6.65 0.105 
FEMALE 0.140*** 7.65 0.049 
Formal and Informal Educ.    
EDUCATION 0.002 1.15 0.001 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION -0.006 -0.44 -0.002 
Marital Status    
WIDOWED -0.046 -1.30 -0.016 
DIVORCED -0.053 -1.62 -0.019 
SEPARATED -0.136** -2.10 -0.049 
NEVER MARRIED -0.138*** -5.30 -0.049 
Employment Status    
PART TIME EMPLOYEE -0.096*** -2.90 -0.034 
SELF-EMPLOYED 0.008 0.22 0.003 
RETIRED 0.066* 1.93 0.023 
AT HOME 0.013 0.38 0.005 
STUDENT -0.184*** -4.36 -0.067 
UNEMPLOYED -0.008 -0.23 -0.003 
OTHER 0.061 0.97 0.021 
Religiosity    
CHURCH ATTENDANCE -0.008** -2.06 -0.003 
REGION       
COUNTRY YES    
Pseudo R2 0.095    
Number of observations 30691    
Prob > chi2  0.000     
  Notes: The reference group consists of AGE<30, MALE, MARRIED, FULL-TIME  
  EMPLOYEE, LOWES CLASS,   EASTERN    EUROPE. Probit = original version (see EQ1, Table 1).     
  Significance levels are: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
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